the tensions between state bureaucracies and the labor unions and their debates in 2005. I present how the strikes were largely successful, starting from workers' spontaneous strikes, which triggered labor newspapers' actions to influence responses from the labor unions and the state at both local and central levels. The larger implication of this case study is that labor organizing and mostly spontaneous collective action, warranted by the political economic climate of 2006 (before Vietnam joined the World Trade Organization), can still be successful even within the context of a one-party state in a globalized environment. I argue that labor unions, empowered by their dynamic pro-labor newspapers, can respond positively and effectively to workers' plights.
Context for the Minimum Wage Issue: The Vietnamese General
Confederation of Labor, the State, and Foreign Capital
The history and context of the minimum wage debates set the stage for successful strikes in December 2005 to increase the minimum wage in FDI companies. Vietnam's pro-FDI policy, dating back to 1999, influenced the behaviors of key stakeholders: the two ministries of Labor and Finance, the Vietnamese General Confederation of Labor (VGCL), and the FDI community. Within the pro-FDI context, the policy of the Vietnamese Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA) created a wage structure that benefited capital more than labor. According to Decision 708, FDI workers were paid in Vietnamese d -o   ng (VND) instead of U.S. dollars (USD), based on the exchange rate set by MOLISA, 13,910 VND per USD. Consequently, the highest minimum wage of $45 USD in big cities was equivalent to 625,950 VND. In suburban areas, such as Binh Duong and Dong Nai, workers received an even lower monthly wage: 556,000 VND (about $40 USD). However, for seven years (1999 to the end of 2005), even when the VND was devalued 15 percent, (from 13,900 to 16,000 VND/USD), MOLISA failed to adjust this minimum wage in VND.
1 Taking advantage of this inertia, global suppliers/managers still paid city workers the same wage in VND, irrespective of this devaluation. Therefore, as of 2005, if one used the devalued exchange rate, workers actually brought home only $39 USD per month, which, according to the International Labor Organization (ILO), is one of the lowest minimum wages in the world, even lower than Cambodia's and China's (according to the Laborer, a union newspaper in Ho Chi Minh City, December 29, 2005 , and confirmed in phone interviews with Laborer journalist Le in 2005) . Moreover, on October 1, 2005, a 21 percent increase in the minimum wage for workers in the state sector (from 290,000 to 350,000 VND) had heightened the expectations of FDI workers to receive their minimum wage increase also.
Charged by the prime minister to draft the minimum wage increase, MOLISA consulted with the VGCL and the business community nationwide in 2005. Using the forums of the Vietnamese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) in the last quarter of 2005, MOLISA obtained perspectives from the business community on the minimum wage increase, in particular, chambers of commerce from the United States, Europe, Taiwan, and South Korea. The chronology in Appendix A shows key events leading to the minimum wage strikes and their aftermath. Three general patterns emerged: the pro-labor perspective of VGCL that proposed a 40 percent minimum wage increase (from the 626,000 VND since 1999 to 870,000 VND); the pro-FDI tendency of MOLISA, Finance Ministry, VCCI, and FDI community that proposed a smaller 26 percent increase (from 626,000 VND to 790,000 VND). The third perspective reflects local concerns that were most impacted: Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) People's Committee and Labor Federation who argued for a 40 percent increase to compensate for the inflation rate and the VND devaluation. (This information was published by the VCCI Forum, January 5, 2006.) The fight over raising the minimum wage in the FDI sector was not "if" but "when" and what would be the levels of the raise. The negotiations between the VGCL and MOLISA (in alliance with the VCCI and FDI community) to influence the prime minister's decision on the starting date of the minimum wage hike resulted in two plans being proposed in November 2005. The prime minister's delay in announcing his decision created an atmosphere of uncertainty that management took advantage of. MOLISA (as the principal player in charge of this task) proposed two plans to the prime minister: Plan A would raise the minimum wage based on the actual wage paid by FDI companies and the equilibrium wage in the labor market (the three-tiered structure for city/suburb/rural areas respectively: 870,000 VND; 790,000 VND; 710,000 VND); Plan B would raise the minimum wage less, according to an increase in the cost-of-living index: 790,000; 710,000; 630,000. What unfolded in the days before the onset of the strikes reflected the divide between a pro-labor group (VGCL) and a pro-FDI group (MOLISA and other relevant ministries), as well as the powerful role of the HCMC People's Committee (government), the HCMC Labor Federation, and the HCMC Export Processing and Industrial Zones Authority (HEPZA). Also, the joint resolution of the MOLISA minister and the former VGCL president (discussed below) provides insights into this tension. Before the massive wave of minimum wage protests, a management-advocate newspaper published by the VCCI noted that the Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Finance, and the VCCI, together with a majority of foreign investors in the FDI community, gravitated toward Plan B (raising minimum wage to only 790,000), because, according to the VCCI Forum, "it is more optimal than Plan A" (which would raise the minimum wage to 870,000).
Vietnamese currency (relative to U.S. dollars) of 14 percent, since workers receive Vietnamese d -o   ng and not U.S. dollars. These two aspects added up to 42 percent which may explain the 40 percent minimum wage hike pushed forward by HCMC Labor Federation.
The ambivalence of the state, seen through the hesitation of the prime minister in announcing the effective date for the minimum wage increase, reflects the dilemmas of a socialist state integrating into the global market economy: wanting to promote FDI policy, and also having to deal with structural changes in the state sector. On January 4, 2006, Dang Ngoc Chien (vice-president of the VGCL who worked with the MOLISA unit charged by the prime minister to propose plans for minimum wage increase in FDI companies) attributed the delay in raising the minimum wage to a pro-FDI policy: "The state ministries were afraid that such increase might affect the policy to attract FDI into Vietnam." Moreover, there is another form of inertia: economic restructuring problems in socialist Vietnam. Raising it in the FDI sector would create pressure to raise the minimum wage throughout the state sector, which includes both civil servants and state workers. This may have added to the indecisiveness of the prime minister's decision: according to Thanh, Salary and Wages Department, MOLISA, "The delay was also due to the big gap between minimum wage in the state sector and the FDI sector." Moreover, the financial implication means a higher state contribution to social security and health care based on higher minimum wage for all pensioners. MOLISA already announced the road map to arrive at one common minimum wage for all sectors by 2010 to accommodate structural changes in the state sector's employment.
Would raising the minimum wage really help workers? That question opens many other issues that show the tension between the state and the VGCL. From a state perspective, more efficient negotiations and bargaining skills of labor unions and workers rather than raising the minimum wage would improve workers' conditions. For instance, Thanh (as reported in the VCCI Forum) slightly nudged the VGCL to strengthen its ineffective enterprise labor unions in negotiations with FDI management (see Tran 2007 for VGCL structural weaknesses): "The government always encouraged FDI companies to pay higher than the minimum wage, and this effort relies on the role of enterprise-level labor unions to bargain with FDI management." Fighting for a living wage, rather than the rock-bottom minimum wage, is another state perspective critical of the VGCL leadership role.
Role of East Asian Capital
To understand the significance of East Asian factories in strikes, one needs to understand the structure of FDI in Vietnam. Foreign capital began entering Vietnam most notably after 1986, when Vietnam formally engaged in the market system. article (Tran 2007 4 These investors manufacture a wide range of products such as textile/garment, electronics, leather/shoes, household, mechanics, wood, service, and jewelry. But in labor-intensive industries such as garment/textile and footwear manufacturing, most FDI ventures come from Taiwan and South Korea, and most of their factories concentrate in the south of Vietnam (Norlund 2004 ; also found in an MPI Report of 2006) .
To be sure, labor dissatisfaction and industrial conflicts occurred in both FDI and Vietnamese factories under flexible production. 5 However, it is not only that protests in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are subtle and implicit; there is also a sense of "political correctness" when focusing on foreign enterprises, because they "represent the capital that only recently had been viewed as dangerous and exploitative" (Norlund 2004, 126) .
As shown in Figures 1, 2 , and 3, most strikes occur in companies with foreign capital and management, especially from Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong, and in southern industrialized provinces, such as HCMC, Binh Duong, and Dong Nai. Figure 1 focuses on strikes by ownership types. Most reported strikes occurred in the FDI sector; this can be explained by the shrinking number of SOEs (being privatized or "equitized") and increasing numbers of FDI companies. To be sure, state workers do protest, but labor disputes in SOEs, rather than open strikes, take the forms of petitions and complaint letters sent to local labor newspapers, local departments of MOLISA, and district labor unions (Phone interviews with Le, Laborer journalist, June 2005.) Since strikes were legalized in 1995, over twelve hundred strikes have erupted as of this writing. While there is a discrepancy on the number of strikes from different sources, which may be because of different ways in which strikes are defined, most sources agree on two points: (1) most reported strikes occurred in the FDI sector; (2) most strikes were spontaneous and without labor union leadership. 6 Figure 2 shows the geographical distribution of strikes. Most FDI factories are concentrated in the south of Vietnam, especially HCMC and industrial provinces such as Binh Duong and Dong Nai, and much less so in the north. Figure 3 focuses on nationality of capital (where FDI comes from), which is significant because most FDI companies in HEPZA are from East Asia, namely Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Japan, and Singapore. The strike that sparked the wave of strikes demanding a minimum wage increase in December 2005 occurred in Freetrend Industrial, a 100 percent Taiwanese leather/shoe company.
The Case of Freetrend Minimum Wage Strikes
To what extent did these wildcat strikes have organization and leadership? Who were the strikers? How did the HCMC Labor Federation, HEPZA, and enterprise labor unions respond to workers' strikes? How did the state respond? What was the role of labor newspapers? To answer these questions, I focus on the first minimum wage strike, which was sparked in Freetrend Industrial, a Taiwanese supplier for Nike and Adidas, in one of the premier export processing zones (EPZs) in HCMC: the Linh Trung I EPZ. (See Appendix B for photographs.)
Relatively high labor unionization rates and some financial independence of enterprise labor unions in Freetrend do not necessarily mean that workers' rights and interests are safeguarded on the factory floor. For their own production stability interests, Freetrend's management offers labor contracts, and participates in social and health insurance programs to maintain a steady supply of workers for continuous production. They allow enterprise unionization: 68 percent unionization in 2004 (16,185 union members out of a total workforce of 23,730, according to the Laborer, March 2004). Having three full-time union representatives, paid by membership fees, is not adequate to interact with over 23,000 workers, much less efficient in standing up to management to fight for their workers' interests. Many migrant workers at Freetrend complained that they had never met these three union representatives while working there for years. For instance, when line leaders from management side hit workers who made mistakes with the shoes they assembled, those three labor union representatives did not intervene (correspondence with Ms. Hong, a Laborer journalist, August 2006) .
From the workers' perspective, their collective action did not happen overnight but was gradually aggravated by a series of unfulfilled promises made by foreign 
Figure 1 Strikes by Ownership Types
management. In the case of Freetrend, when workers witnessed a 21 percent increase in the minimum wage of state workers starting in October 2005, 7 they spontaneously demanded that management match that raise, to which they received a management promise of a 30 percent minimum wage increase effective in November 2005. In December 2005, they received a fixed raise of only 100,000 VND per person/month (about $6.25 USD), less than state workers who received a 21 percent increase in their minimum wage starting October 1, 2005. Only after a massive number of workers went on strike did Freetrend's management agree to raise skilled workers' wage by 220,000 VND per month and trainees by 162,000 VND per month. Still, this raise of about 25 percent was less than the 30 percent raise that Freetrend's management promised back in 2005 (according to the Laborer, December 28, 2005) .
Then came the biggest strike that sparked the minimum wage strike waves in December 2005. The outcome was an unprecedented strike of eighteen thousand workers, the highest number at the time of writing, which showed workers' selforganizing power and discipline. Workers gained a 40 percent increase in the minimum wage which had been frozen for the past ten years (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) . The three new levels of the minimum wage are 870,000 VND (about $54 USD), 790,000 VND ($49 USD), and 710,000 VND ($44 USD). No violent outbursts occurred: strikers stopped working and sat in front of the factory in Linh Trung I EPZ. Workers out of desperation went on strike against foreign management, a more "politically correct" target to achieve a raise, rather than striking against the government, whose crackdowns on dissenters provide a credible deterrence. On the common question of whether the government was behind these strikes, no evidence can be found, plus it is not in the pro-FDI government's interest to disrupt their relations with the FDI community. . The minimum wage strikes ran for ten days (from December 28, 2005 to January 7, 2006) with fourteen large and small work stoppages, involving a total of about 42,000 workers (in three FDI companies), pushing the state to raise the minimum wage levels by 40 percent in FDI companies effective February 1, 2006. The first three massive spontaneous work stoppages took place in three nearby FDI factories in Linh Trung EPZ, (according to the Laborer, December 2005); then this wave spread to other FDI factories. The first spark was on December 28 in Freetrend Industrial with eighteen thousand strikers; then on December 29 and 30 it spread to Kollan company (South Korean-owned; see Appendix B) with four thousand strikers, and then Hugo (South Korean-owned) with one thousand strikers. Note that the new rates are intended for low-skilled workers only; workers who had on-the-job training were to receive at least 7 percent higher than those minimum wages. Most Freetrend strikers were migrant workers from the north and central provinces; while no labor organizer officially emerged from this huge crowd, they were effective in labor organizing. This provides evidence of the creation of new working classes, that is, migrant workers, producing strong labor movements in these new sites of flexible production (Tran 2007) . According to some Laborer journalists who witnessed the strike scenes and did follow-up reports, the workers collectively made a very strategic and wise decision, since they knew that if they acted as a group, management would be unable to identify the strike leaders and suppress them. These journalists found that the strikers had accumulated years of discontent and frustration with the substandard pay and working conditions; thus as soon as some activist workers secretly suggested work stoppage, although many workers had no idea who the initiators were, they followed suit spontaneously (interviews and correspondence with Laborer journalists Le, Hong, Pham, and Nguyen in July, August, and . What would be the roles of the labor unions and the state in setting up a framework to cope with this development? All three levels of labor organizations-the HCMC Labor Federation, the HEPZA labor unions, and Freetrend labor unionsbecame involved to resolve this unprecedented huge strike. At the height of the Freetrend strike, Lieu Quang Vinh, the chairman of Freetrend labor unions, pleaded with workers not to engage in violence. Workers agreed, but they pressured him to negotiate on their behalf: "We believe you, but with such low wages, how can we survive? Why don't you do the math for us: with only several hundreds of thousands VND per month [less than $60 USD], how can we survive? Why don't you come in to negotiate with management on our behalf and we wait outside?" Vinh's voice trembled when he pleaded "Please do not destroy the factory." Then he joined the labor union representatives from HEPZA and HCMC Labor Federation, and local state officials (from the Department of Labor in HCMC and the HCMC People's Committee) in a closed-door meeting. The strike leaders were not present in that meeting. Consequently, eighteen thousand Freetrend workers kept their promise and did not resort to violence. This workers' discipline facilitated the negotiations and resulted in Freetrend management's promise to raise and adjust wages to compensate for rising inflation rates and increased costs of living (account reported by the Laborer on January 17, 2006).
Local state officials' motivations were not immediately pro-labor. At the beginning, local state bureaucracies, the HCMC People's Committee, and HEPZA management blamed labor newspaper reports for instigating and spreading the strikes. One explanation for this reaction is that the local state was responding to strong pressure from the business/management side, such as Amcham, Eurocham, VCCI, other East Asian chambers of commerce (as revealed in a joint Chambers of Commerce letter of January 11, 2006). However, when pushed by the labor press, they did intervene. All personnel of the HEPZA management team and HEPZA Labor Union spent the night in the Freetrend factory's vicinity to calm both management and workers and to respond to any exigencies. The HCMC People's Committee, DOLISA, and the police force were also there to resolve the conflict. They advised workers to be calm and to wait for the government to raise the minimum wage in FDI companies. As soon as the HCMC People's Committee sent the communiqué to the prime minister to confirm the severity of these massive strikes, the prime minister responded immediately on the side of the workers in a struggle against FDI companies. This prompt response indicates the central state's fear of possible political upheaval as a by-product of industrial conflicts in a strategic city such as HCMC where problems (economic, social, and political) would ripple throughout the country. (This information was obtained from an interview with Laborer reporter, Ms. Le, March 2006.) 
Steering Wheels for Workers: The Role of Labor Newspapers in Minimum Wage Decision
"Taking on the steering wheels for workers," as aptly expressed by a VGCL official, the labor newspapers acted as an advocate for workers by exposing these strikes in a matter of hours (as Tran Van Ly revealed in an interview in August 2006) . These accounts then pushed the HCMC People's Committee and DOLISA to act, criticized MOLISA for their indecision in labor policy, and ultimately pressured the prime minister to arrive at a concrete decision in response to workers' requests (see chronology, Appendix A). During the whole strike period, HCMC Labor Federation and the HEPZA Labor Union distributed the key labor newspaper in southern Vietnam, the Laborer, for free to tens of thousands of workers in the Linh Trung I EPZ. See photograph in Appendix B titled "Dana Vina Workers reading complimentary Laborer newspapers.")
The Laborer and an allied newspaper Labor exposed these strikes promptly as they occurred while clearly announcing the pro-labor position of HCMC Labor Federation (see chronology, Appendix A). Several hours after the first spark, the Laborer had same-day coverage of the strike in Freetrend on December 28, 2005. Then, one day after the first three strikes, on December 29, 2005, two very important articles appeared in the Laborer. "Wait until When?" was the first and it criticized MOLISA on their minimum wage policy, which tends to promote management's interests rather than those of workers. In this on-the-spot coverage of the strikes, the journalists openly critiqued MOLISA for kowtowing to foreign capital: "Continuing to postpone the increase in the minimum wage in FDI companies, it seems that MOLISA had 'favored' FDI companies too much at the expense of millions of workers who were anxiously waiting every day for this increase to improve their hard and struggling lives. Workers will have to wait until when?" "Increasing the Minimum Wage in FDI Companies: We Can Wait No Longer!" was the second piece in which the Laborer estimated the accumulated costs of the sevenyear consequences of MOLISA Decision 708 on Vietnamese workers in FDI companies in terms of lost wages and social security benefits to the tune of about $430 million USD.
Interestingly, evidence shows that the labor press, consisting of two key labor newspapers, supported each other during these strikes. They took turns "taking the heat" and pressuring both the local government and central bureaucracy to respond to workers' requests. When the Laborer was criticized by the HCMC People's Committee and MOLISA as being an "instigator," the Labor joined in by reporting those strikes, which had now spread to other FDI factories in the south, beyond Freetrend Industrial. The Labor could do so because it had no direct political constraints, since it is not under the "jurisdiction" of HCMC People's Committee (according to Le, Laborer journalist, August 2006) (see chronology, Appendix A). While events back then gave hope for an arguably emerging "autonomous" labor press, the lack of reports on crackdowns on several workers, who allegedly belonged to a non-VGCL labor union, in November 2006 shows the limit to labor newspaper coverage, especially when power of the state and the VGCL are at stake. More indepth research is needed on this issue.
Arguably, back then the newspaper arm helped the VGCL to be a relatively more autonomous body vis-à-vis the state bureaucracy to represent workers' rights and interests. These timely reports made public the viewpoints of the top VGCL leadership at the most critical time, which helped workers' collective action (see chronology, Appendix A). First, they forced the top leadership of the VGCL and MOLISA to respond to overwhelming workers' demand. Two days after these two important articles, Cu Thi Hau (then president of the VGCL) worked with Nguyen Thi Hang (minister of MOLISA) on a joint resolution, which was submitted to the prime minister on December 31, 2005. This resolution confirms those articles' arguments about the pro-FDI tendency of MOLISA, the power of spontaneous workers' strikes, and the effectiveness of the labor press in timely response to these strikes. It proposed Plan A (the higher three-tiered wage structure) and recommended January 1, 2006, as the starting date of the minimum wage hike instead of four months later, April 1, 2006, as proposed by MOLISA. It reiterated the real life conditions that necessitated a 40 percent increase in minimum wage in FDI companies, consistent with the HCMC People's Committee's perspective.
A January 2006 Labor interview with then-VGCL leader Cu Thi Hau clearly indicated tensions between MOLISA and the VGCL. As soon as spontaneous strikes erupted in FDI companies, Cu met with the MOLISA minister on December 31, 2005, and January 1, 2006, to unify their positions about the minimum wage hike (in both timeframe and amount). In general, she supported the workers' demand: "While the strike procedure was not legal, workers' request was legitimate," and was very attentive to the timely needs of migrant workers: "The VGCL considered that strikes in FDI factories to raise the minimum wage are legitimate. So, we need to urgently resolve this wage increase for workers; if not, sympathetic strikes (dinh cong day chuyen) would become even more serious, especially in the most sensitive time near Tet [the Vietnamese Lunar New Year often occurs in February] when workers get ready to return home with their families."
She was outspoken about the delayed actions of state bureaucracy, notably MOLISA, which was charged to advise the prime minister on a road map for minimum wage increase:
In reality, in the last several years, the VGCL had proposed to the Prime Minister many times about the need to raise the minimum wage in the FDI sector. Specifically, in 2004, this minimum wage increase was one of the ten major recommendations we put forward to the Prime Minister who charged MOLISA to lead the effort to plan for this increase. Again in November 2005, the VGCL continued to reiterate this minimum-wage recommendation to the Prime Minister [Phan Van Khai at that time] which prompted him to issue a formal Decision [December 8, 2005 ] to push MOLISA to work with the VGCL and other relevant ministries to come up with concrete recommendation.
On coordination between the VGCL and relevant state bureaucracies, she said: ". . . the extreme delay of state bureaucracy in consultation with the Prime Minister had resulted in these massive strikes. I think the need to respect and genuinely listen to recommendations from the VGCL are key lessons to improve the coordination between VGCL and state bureaucracies" (reported in Labor, .
From the local state perspective, after having read the Laborer reports, Nguyen Thien Nhan, then vice-president of the HCMC People's Committee, visited these strikes, and on the following day sent a communiqué to the prime minister requesting his response to these strikes (January 4, 2006) . On January 6, 2006, the prime minister formally signed Decision 03 to raise the minimum wage in FDI companies, which took effect in February 2006 . , and also contended that there was inadequate consultation with them, for which they claimed to be unprepared. Thanks to workers' spontaneous collective action that led to MOLISA's change in tone about the minimum wage issue, its formal response on January 27, 2006, to that criticism clearly showed the pro-labor position and implied that mistakes were made by management in most cases: "The occurred pay disputes have shown that some issues in relation to labour such as salary or salary scale, labour norms, labour conditions, working time and relaxation time, etc., haven't been carried out completely and unanimously in accordance with the regulations of Labour Legislation." Moreover, Nguyen Manh Cuong, Director of International Relations Department, and Nguyen Thi Dan, Director of the Wages and Salaries Department of DOLISA in HCMC, expressed doubts about these management criticisms during interviews in August 2006: "Management understands the complex ramifications of the raise and they would benefit from a delayed state announcement on the effective date; however, workers cannot wait any longer and fully expected some raises, therefore they went on strike."
Aftermath of Minimum Wage Strikes: Reactions of Local State and Newspapers
The reactions of local state and labor press to expedite the implementation of this decree were extremely fast. The local state response was relatively pro-labor, in recognition of the lack of effective enterprise labor unions. The HCMC People's Committee allowed some workers' representation at the negotiating table with other stakeholders in nonunionized factories. On March 6, 2006, the vice-president of HCMC People's Committee signed Ordinance 35, Decision on Protocol for coordination and preliminary resolution of wildcard strikes in HCMC. This protocol, enforced only in HCMC, charges district/ward people's committees to form a group of state officials who temporarily represent workers in nonunionized factories until the immediate higher-level VGCL labor unions (such as district level) establish official enterprise labor unions (according to Nguyen Thi Dan during an interview in July 2006) . With the revised Chapter 14 on strikes, a nationwide ordinance will be issued to guide its implementation in July 2007.
These quick reactions of local state and labor press show conscious efforts are being made to address weaknesses in implementing labor policies. Response came in only five days compared with the months that had been common practice. Moreover, the labor press was very effective in preempting potential management evasions of the law to protect workers' rights and interests. On January 11, 2006, only five days after the issuance of the Prime Minister's Decree No. 03 on January 6, 2006, MOLISA issued a formal Ordinance No. 120 to instruct all local state bureaucracies and labor unions (including HEPZA) to properly implement the Prime Minister's Decree, as well as all state media to disseminate these decisions and instructions to ensure management compliance.
On the same day, a Laborer journalist interviewed a key representative from the Department of Labor (in HCMC) and reported key issues to ensure that workers got paid properly according to their skill levels (skilled workers should receive higher than the rock-bottom minimum wage), and to preempt management from finding ways to evade this minimum wage hike. For instance, companies are not permitted to cut social security and health benefits to compensate for a minimum wage hike, and companies have to be transparent and post information about salary levels and raises. Moreover, these labor newspapers continue to be a forum for workers' requests. For instance, the "Counseling on Labor Laws" section presents direct dialogues between workers and management. As exposed in a query entitled: "Adjusting wages according to the new minimum wage law," a worker in a joint venture in HCMC questioned why she did not receive an increase in minimum wage even after the new law went into effect in February 2006 , to which the personnel director promised to consult with local labor agencies to resolve her complaint (as reported in the Laborer in March of 2006).
Challenged by the strikes, the VGCL accepted its own structural weakness and supported some temporary forms of workers' representation in nonunionized factories. But it still wants to preserve its monopolistic power on workermanagement relations. Conscious efforts have been made by the VGCL leaders to better connect with local labor unions, to improve their budget for greater union activities, and to alleviate some inequity arising from pro-FDI policy. 8 They come down to meet and listen to local labor unions in southern strike-prone areas and use their pragmatic solutions to address VGCL structural weaknesses on workers' behalf. At this writing, only textual analysis can be done, since this new strike law does not go into effect until July 1, 2007. This new law represents some compromises among three main interests: VGCL, state, and FDI community. While the strike protocols are more streamlined and clearly defined with time limits, they underscore the role of labor unions and local state in leading strikes. It remains to be seen how the new strike law addresses the weakness of the enterprise-level reconciliation committee (because of enterprise unions' salaries being paid by management and state mediators being few and far between (interview with Ms. Nguyen, Director of the Wages Department of HCMC Department of Labor, July 2006) . The main thrust seems to be the establishment of arbitration committees beyond the enterprises to preempt strikes in nonunionized factories. At least in principle, this new law does not rely on the enterprise labor unions (considering their weakness) to arbitrate with management when there are labor violations.
Implications of the New Strike Law
On the right to strike and workers' representation, while allowing workers the right to organize, even in nonunionized factories, the VGCL underscores their role in leading strikes. Two protocols with clearly defined roles of local state and labor unions indicate the official position of not recognizing any independent form of labor organizing, sustaining their power grip on labor-capital relations and desire for political stability. 9 Recall the nationwide debates from 2004 to 2006 on sensitive issues of what to do with spontaneous labor organizing and strikes in companies without unions or with ineffective enterprise labor unions; several outspoken delegates in strike-prone provinces throughout Vietnam even expressed doubts about VGCL effectiveness. 10 Some even suggested temporary recognition of some forms of independent labor representation, not within the purview of the VGCL.
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Clearly, compromises had been made to appease the FDI community on workers' right to strike. The connections between types of disputes (rights-based or interestbased) and the right to strike are very significant to workers, because when basic wages are not livable (a reality), other allowances become vital to their survival. This new law clearly distinguishes between disputes on rights (violations of basic stipulations on wages, work hours, overtime hours, and compensation, stated in the collective bargaining agreements) and disputes on interests (violations of allowances such as raises, bonuses, social security, health and unemployment benefits, beyond collective bargaining agreements). Thus, it rejected the progressive position of some outspoken southern delegates on the inseparability of rights and interests.
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The protocol for group disputes (rather than individual disputes, which are separate in Chapter 14) indicates that it is more difficult to strike on rights-based disputes, with the labor/people court designated to be the last resort. 13 By institutionalizing several key committees, the new strike protocol tends to embolden the roles of local state agencies and labor unions and to curtail spontaneous strikes. It requires the formation of enterprise-level reconciliation committees (hoi dong hoa giai co so) in factories that do have enterprise labor unions or provisionary labor union executive committees (ban chap hanh cong doan lam thoi).
14 The key difference is to ensure an equal number of representatives from both sides (labor and management) on this committee. In case this committee cannot be formed, a local labor arbitrator/ mediator (hoa giai vien lao dong), appointed by the local department of the Ministry of Labor at the city/provincial level, will arbitrate the conflict. At the city level, a labor arbitration committee (hoi dong trong tai lao dong), established by the local people's committees, is responsible for resolving the factory-level conflicts. It consists of representatives from the local labor federation, the local department of Ministry of Labor, management, and labor relations experts.
The two sets of protocols for dispute resolution, one rights-based and the other interests-based, clearly define the timeframe, relevant arbitration committees, and their responsibilities. For the rights-based dispute protocol, local state leads the effort: within five working days after the receipt of letter of complaints, the chairman of the people's committee (in the affected area) calls for a meeting consisting of representatives from all sides. They include members serving on the enterpriselevel reconciliation committee (if nonexistent, a local labor arbitrator is needed), immediate higher-level of labor unions and other relevant agencies (if needed), and the last resort is the people's court at city/provincial level. If the time limit runs out when the dispute is still not resolved after having exhausted all the above channels, then workers can proceed to strike. For the interests-based dispute protocol, a more broad-based labor committee leads the charge: within seven working days after the receipt of letter of complaints, the labor arbitration committee calls for a meeting consisting of representatives from all sides. They include members serving on the enterprise-level reconciliation committee (if nonexistent, a local labor arbitrator is needed) and immediate higher-level of labor unions and other relevant agencies (if needed). If the time limit runs out when both sides are still not satisfied with the resolution suggested by the labor arbitration committee (or one side did not attend the meetings) and after the meeting minutes are distributed to all sides within one day, then workers can proceed to strike. The strike limit is one year since the date of labor violations.
Conclusion
This case study demonstrates that there are alternatives to the "race to the bottom" thesis. To the extent permitted by the state, there is space for resistance in Vietnam: evidence shows that migrant workers are able to organize and protest, albeit primarily for short-term basic worker rights, against serving as "cheap labor" for global capital in a socialist country that has to deal with ramifications from its pro-FDI policy.
Evidence also shows that top leadership waited until some critical articles and interviews appeared in the Laborer before they actively responded to workers' protests. Acting within a permissible space, the dynamic media arm has strategically empowered local labor unions and effectively pushed central labor unions and the state to effect policy changes on workers' behalf: as immediate as the policy to raise the minimum wage in January 2006, and as long-term as the new revised strike law ratified in November 2006. However, at the time of writing, crackdowns on dissenters in Vietnam plus social consequences of the ongoing equitization process of state-owned enterprises disadvantaging workers necessitate further research on the limits of state tolerance for labor organizing and protests beyond the "permissible" foreign capital sector.
